There is a rising level of concern that agriculture might be targeted for economic sabotage by terrorists. Knowledge gathered about the Soviet Union biological weapons program following its dissolution in 1991, and about Iraq following the Gulf War, confirmed that animals and agricultural crops were targets of bioweapon development and weaponization. The American public has been exposed to a blitz of news stories about weapons of mass destruction with a renewed emphasis on biological weapons. There have been numerous newspaper articles, books, television specials, radio shows, and new websites, all devoted to the issue of bioweapons and bioterrorism. A number of new books have been published providing some of the history of the development of biological weapons during the past century and describing some of the major players involved in their development (2, 27, 47, 55, 59, 73, 87) . More than a dozen countries are suspected of maintaining ongoing offensive biological weapons research programs (20, 59, 64) . These revelations are particularly disturbing in light of the fact that most of these countries are States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that entered into force in 1975.
The potential for misusing biotechnology to create more-virulent pathogens and the lack of international means to detect unethical uses of new technologies to create destructive bioweapons are of increasing concern. Foreign animal disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or intentionally introduced, involving agricultural pathogens that destroy livestock would have a profound impact on a country's infrastructure, economy, and export markets. In the United States, such outbreaks would also erode consumer confidence in the safety of our food supply. This chapter deals with the history of agroterrorism, biological crimes, and biological warfare directed toward animal agriculture, specifically horses, cattle (both beef and dairy), swine, sheep, goats, and poultry. There are surprisingly few reviews that highlight antilivestock biological weapons and even fewer that provide any credible details as to what pathogens might pose the greatest threats to animal agriculture (2, 23, 25, 39, 40, 51, 64, 84) . The threat of biological weapons directed towards crops was recently reviewed (77; http://www.scisoc.org/lecture/Biosecurity/Top.html). The criminal and terrorist threat to processed food has also recently been reviewed (46) .
DEFINING TERRORISM
"Local and regional conflicts, famine, economic disparity, mass movements of refugees, and brutal and corrupt regimes contribute to instability and fuel a frustration and a desperation that increasingly finds expression in acts of terror" (70) . Simon contends that any attempts to define terrorism are futile and only add to the sense of confusion that people have about what really constitutes a terrorist act (79) . He further adds that most definitions of terrorism are either too broad or too narrow. Between 1936 and 1980 there were over one hundred definitions coined for terrorism, and that was long before the current interest on terrorism emerged. Seth Carus, in his detailed scholarly work "Bioterrorism Biocrimes," defines a terrorist as "a non-state actor who uses violence on behalf of a political cause without reference to the moral or political justice of the cause. This includes non-state actors who operate in organized military units (as with guerillas) if the use of biological agents is undertaken covertly using improvised delivery systems" (23) . We will adhere to his definition in this chapter. The Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies may have their own definitions of terrorism. A criminal is any perpetrator who uses violence for purposes not related in any way to political, ideological, religious, or social causes (83) . Motivation for criminal and terrorist activity may overlap.
Carus (23) defines a biological weapon agent as organisms or toxins produced by organisms that can be used against people, animals, or crops. Chemical agents used as weapons are man-made poisonous substances that kill or incapacitate. Again, the definition of a biological or chemical weapon may vary depending on which agency or institution is defining it. Terrorism has become commonplace throughout the world, is growing in activity, and is driven by psychological, ideological, economic, religious, and environmental factors (23, 54, 78, 79, 84) . Terrorism is a battle in which anyone can become a victim and where any individual from any place or position can serve as a perpetrator (69, 79) . In its simplest terms, bioterrorism is nothing more than criminal violence. Many nonpolitical factors motivate criminals. Biocrimes targeting livestock may be motivated by revenge or desire for personal financial gain (23) . Recently, the term "agroterrorism" as a form of economic attack has emerged in some news articles in reference to biological weapons targeting animal and crop agriculture (42) .
WHO MIGHT PRESENT A BIOTERRORIST THREAT?
Traditionally, our primary concerns have centered on state-sponsored terrorism or military programs as the primary drivers of bioweapon development and use. Recently, however, rogue states have been added to the list of potential government-sponsored terrorist groups (20) . The Cold War has given way to regional armed conflicts rooted in ethnic clashes and enormous inequalities of income and opportunities for many groups of people (http://www.undp.org.hdro.E5.html). National and international boundaries have been blurred by the virtually free flow of refugees, drugs, weapons, and laundered money. Organized crime syndicates are estimated to gross $1.5 trillion a year (http://www.undp.org.hdro.E5.html). In this environment, there are a number of new actors who have used or might resort to use of bioterrorism. On the rise in the world today are groups driven by strong religious zeal, hatred, or conflict and groups seeking new methods to enact ethnic cleansing. Other groups who might utilize bioterrorism would be organized crime groups such as those that deal in the international narcotics trade. Militia groups, cult sects, and Armageddon believers all have threatened to use or have used terrorism in recent years. Disgruntled individuals and "copy cat" individuals often look for ways to gain public recognition (23, 81) . Less traditional groups now resorting to terrorist tactics include antiabortionists, who send letters filled with various powders purported to be anthrax spores. Fortunately, all of these incidences have turned out to be hoaxes. Animal rights groups are renowned for releasing experimental animals from facilities and could pose a new threat of releasing experimental animals infected with dangerous pathogens that could pose a threat to humans and domestic and wild animals. Advocacy groups opposed to genetically modified foodstuffs might inadvertently spread disease in their zeal to destroy genetically modified animals and plants.
The conflict between First World prosperity and Third World poverty continues to be a volatile issue. It is projected that by 2050, 8 billion of the world's 9.5 billion people will live in developing countries, with consequent continually rising social and environmental pressures. The richest fifth of the world, which includes the United States, Canada, and western Europe, consumes 86% of all the goods and services of the world, while the poorest third consumes just 1.3% (http://www.undp.org/hdro/ES.html). Some individuals wishing to correct the economic imbalances of the world might very easily resort to economic terrorism as a means of making a statement. Many peoples of the world resent the global dominance of Western cultural norms, the dominance of multinational companies, and the United States as the sole military superpower now remaining. All of these factors focus attention on U.S. citizens and on the U.S. economy. New forms of warfare that do not require sophisticated equipment or delivery systems are something that pose an emerging threat to the tranquil lifestyle to which we have become accustomed. Future wars may be conducted in a sphere not dominated by military actions but instead may resort to two new methods based on bioterrorism or targeting of other major infrastructure, including communications, computer systems, and commercial sabotage.
HISTORY OF AGROTERRORISM, BIOLOGICAL CRIMES, AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TARGETING ANIMAL AGRICULTURE
The literature is replete with information on biological warfare and biocrimes targeting American civilian and military personnel, some of which is factual, balanced, and informative (15, 23, 24, 26, 35, 73, 75) . Publicly available scientific literature pertaining to agroterrorism, biological crimes, and biological warfare targeting livestock and poultry dates back nearly 90 years (1, 2, 43, 48, (82) (83) (84) (85) . These publications discuss, among other things, the criteria for the selection of the biological agent, methods of dissemination, ideal livestock and poultry geographical targeting areas, lists of selected animal and poultry viruses, and negative economic impact figures. Brief descriptions of emergency animal disease response procedures in the event of a biowarfare attack have been presented (1, 7, 25, 33, 37, 43, 44, 80, 82) . Livestock and poultry as targets for agroterrorism, biocrimes, and biowarfare development are therefore not a new topic but one that deserves a contemporary review in light of the new economic and military realignment of today's world. Publications dating back to 1952 conclude that targeting livestock and poultry would be easy and would require only a low level of scientific and technical skills to perpetrate (37, 43, 82) .
One discovers that the use of disease agents in military conflict is as old as human conflict (87) . Documentable incidents from the 20th century involving biological warfare against animals are listed in Table 1 . It should be remembered that the first 20th-century allegations of the use of biological warfare agents were against livestock and not humans. These substantially supported allegations were made against Germany, who employed anthrax and glanders against cattle, sheep, horses, and reindeer in Romania, Spain, France, Norway, Argentina, and the United States during World War I (Table 1) . A recent investigative report concludes that it was an ambitious and well-planned program, conducted on three continents, but that the success of the attacks was questionable (85) . Other authors report that this antilivestock program was successful, killing or incapacitating hundreds of animals (48, 76) . Regardless of the success of the operation, it is a historically documented account of a carefully planned and executed clandestine operation in which livestock were the primary target for use of two biological weapons, and both agents continued to be the subject of intensive research by several countries for use against animals and humans. Wheelis (85) concluded, and we concur, that the German World War I antilivestock program was of special significance because (i) it was the first national biological warfare (BW) program, (ii) it was the first BW program with a scientific foundation, (iii) it was one of two confirmed events of the use of BW agents in wartime, (iv) it was the first and perhaps only extensive use of BW agents by secret agents, and (v) these were the first antilivestock BW events which were well documented.
Recent public reports implicate Japan as the inspiration for the modern biological arms race (47, 73) . In 1938, the Japanese set up a research and development facility, Unit 731, at Ping Fan, south of Harbin in occupied China. The Japanese, employing a variety of biological agents, reportedly killed at least 850 human subjects in their quest to develop bioweapons and to understand the effects of pathogens on human organ systems (47, 73) .
The United Kingdom was the first Western nation to organize an offensive biological weapons program in late 1941 (22) . Between the late 1940s and the 1960s, the United States and Canada joined in and developed both offensive and defensive biological weapons programs, building on the knowledge they uncovered from the Japanese biowarfare program (22, 27, 47) . Researchers experimented with aerosol dispersion of a number of pathogens that would infect both humans and animals. One significant British antilivestock program was entitled Operation Vegetarian and included the stockpiling of 5,000,000 cattle anthrax cakes which were to be delivered by parachute flares over grazing cattle in Germany. Some of the events that were part of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program are well documented (27, 73) . These accounts provide some insight into the U.S. offensive weapons program. During World War II, the United States and Canada had a highly secret animal disease research program conducted on Grosse Isle in the St. Lawrence River. This first War Disease Quarantine Station was developed to study rinderpest virus, a highly fatal disease of cattle. The possibility of the introduction of rinderpest into the Western Hemisphere had long been a matter of serious concern. As a result of both increased air travel and suspected enemy interest in biological warfare, this possibility became alarming in the latter part of 1941. Following several conferences, a Joint United States-Canadian Commission was appointed by the United States Secretary of War and the Canadian Minister of National Defense. A staff of seven scientists were assigned the task of developing means to protect North American livestock from biowarfare agents targeting livestock and poultry. The staff were given two responsibilities. The first was to prepare a tissue vaccine according to methods previously developed, in order to provide a rapid means of surrounding an epidemic outbreak of disease by using a ring immunization approach. The second task was to investigate the possibility of developing an efficient vaccine which would be produced more economically and without requiring the use of large numbers of animals. The program was successful in developing a rinderpest vaccine grown in chicken eggs (45 Zilinskas (88) , all 12 Cuban allegations lacked scientific merit. In April 1997, Cuba registered a formal complaint with the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General accusing the United States of a potential violation of the BW Convention (BWC) by willfully introducing a plant pest, Thrips palmi, to its territory by dispersion from an overflying aircraft. The states parties to the BWC held a formal consultation meeting in August 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland, mediated by the United Kingdom in its role as a BWC depository, to consider the Cuban claim that the United States had violated the BWC. The importance of the allegation lay not only in its seriousness, but also because it was the first test of procedures adopted at the Second Review Conference of States Parties to BWC for consultation and clarification. Both countries gave their statements of evidence to those states parties in attendance. The assembled states did not reach a conclusion, and because of the complexity of the issue and the passage of time, no further investigation has been undertaken.
The unusually large anthrax epidemic in both cattle and humans in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) during the war of independence in the 1970s deserves special mention. Prior to the war, anthrax in both animals and humans, while endemic, was rare and well controlled (28, 52, 53, 59, 63) . During the war, with the collapse of the government administration, including veterinary services, anthrax became a major disease in cattle, with thousands of cases and deaths (28, 53) . There was a corresponding major epidemic in humans, accounting for approximately 10,000 cases and hundreds of deaths. Close examination of the epidemiology of this outbreak indicates that the introduction of anthrax was very likely intentional. The introduction of a biological warfare agent such as anthrax was used to undermine the morale and food supply of those who sought independence. The long-lasting effects on Zimbabwe have continued to impact livestock, wildlife, and humans to the present day.
The biological warfare program of the Republic of South Africa has been partially exposed through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (14, 59) . Preliminary public disclosures strongly suggest that their BW program encompassed antihuman, antianimal, and anticrop activities. Full disclosure relevant to the BW program will most likely never occur because such disclosure would jeopardize government relations with countries that might have cooperated with South Africa in the program but with whom South Africa still maintains diplomatic relations. Research, development, and weaponization of antilivestock agents are reported to have included African swine fever virus and foot-and-mouth disease virus (25, 59) .
In a very recent excellent investigative report on the introduction of rabbit calicivirus disease into New Zealand, Steve Goldstein offers a serious, thorough review of agroterrorism and biological crimes (41) . The introduction of this virus into New Zealand was a very well-planned, organized criminal event. The participants were boastful and arrogant about their criminal acts and showed little remorse (58) . The perpetrators were able to circumvent one of the best and most secure airport and port biosecurity systems in the world. Once the virus had entered the country, it required only a simple, low-tech procedure for the farmers to prepare purees for distribution around their farms. Liver, spleen, and lungs were placed in a kitchen blender and blended into a very potent "kitchen whizz" that was mixed with an appropriate vegetable or food source. The virus entered New Zealand in three ways: mailed into the country in a vial, imported in a vial placed in an air traveler's sock, and imported by an air traveler on a handkerchief that had been drenched in blood and tissues from an infected animal (44) . Rabbit calicivirus was handled with impunity by New Zealand farmers because it was not a zoonotic agent.
In 1992 Russia admitted that the former Soviet Union, despite being a codepository of the BWC, had continued a massive offensive biological weapons program which was conducted illegally for years (2, 20, 55, 68, 74) . With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, government funding for research decreased dramatically, and scientists who were working in the biological weapons program found themselves unemployed or without funds to conduct research. Many came to the United States and Great Britain and other European countries, but a few were attracted to jobs in rogue states. One early defector, Vladimir Pasechnik, provided significant intelligence information on BW programs. In addition, other sources of information, including satellite imagery, indicated that a superpower BW arms race was on (59) . The Sverdlovsk anthrax accident provided additional information regarding the Russian BW program. Another defector was Kanatjan Alibekov, now more commonly known as Ken Alibek, who arrived in the United States in 1992. Alibek had served as the first deputy chief of research for Biopreparat, the umbrella organization that orchestrated the Soviet Union's biological weapons program directed against humans. Biopreparat, established in 1973, was designed to support research and production of bioweapons targeting humans. The program was housed in over 50 laboratory locations and involved tens of thousands of employees (2). This bioweapons program was conducted under the umbrella of multiple ministries. The groups who helped orchestrate this massive program were the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Communist Party Central Committee, the KGB, and the Soviet military. Alibek has stated that the Soviet Union had three bioweapons programs: one in the Ministry of Health, one in the Ministry of Agriculture, and one in the Ministry of Defense.
More is being revealed about the anticrop and antilivestock program, code named "Ecology," of the former Soviet Union through the efforts of new government and nongovernment programs that promote nonproliferation in the former Soviet Union. At its peak, the Soviet Union agriculture BW program is reported to have employed ten thousand staff in an offensive biological weapons program targeting livestock, poultry, and crops. This program was conducted at eight known locations, including the Institute of Veterinary Virology and Microbiology in Pokrof (2, 74) . Despite repeated U.S. attempts to obtain permission to visit these animalagriculture facilities, access, in most cases, continues to be denied. The former Soviet Union program focused on weaponizing a number of antilivestock agents, including foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus, rinderpest virus, classical swine fever and African swine fever viruses, sheep and goat pox viruses, Chlamydia psittaci, and anticrop agents including wheat rust, rice blast, karnal bunt, and Fusarium spp.
Much has been learned about the bioweapons program of Iraq as the result of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) (20, 90) . The UN sent inspection teams in to examine several Iraqi laboratories and production facilities. Evidence of the production of chemical gases, biological agents, and biological toxins was discovered. It is now well documented that even prior to the Gulf War, the Iraq government used chemical weapons against rebellious Kurdish populations in the northern part of the country and against Iranian soldiers during border conflicts. During one Kurdish uprising in Halabja, Iraqi forces used a combination of four toxic chemical weapons, mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and VX, causing numerous deaths in the village (20) . Iraq had an active program to develop biological weapons, but there is no public evidence that Iraq actually utilized bioweapons during the Gulf War. There is, however, clear evidence that Iraq had plans to use biological weapons. The biological weapons identified which were under development were Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium perfringens, Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic virus, yellow fever virus, enterovirus 17, human rotavirus, camelpox, FMD virus, and at least four toxins: aflatoxin, botulinum toxin, ricin, and trichothecenes (20, 90; http://www.cnn.com [18 March 1999] ).
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR ANTILIVESTOCK AND ANTIPOULTRY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Selection criteria for the most dangerous antilivestock and antipoultry biologic agents have been published (7, 37, 43, 82 While viruses pathogenic for humans might make excellent agents for biocrimes or bioterrorist attacks, they are poorly adapted for strategic deployment, with the exception of smallpox, because of their lack of stability in the environment. This animal pathogen list has very few agents in common with the list often given as high-risk antihuman bioweapons agents (15, 20) . In fact, with the exception of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Rift Valley fever virus, C. psittaci, and B. anthracis, the agent list is completely different. Often, the public and even professionally trained scientists assume that the potential BW agent list for humans would be the same as for livestock and poultry. However, the list of livestock and poultry pathogens is based on economic trade impact and ease of transmissibility, while that for humans is based more on high mortality or fear. Anthrax appeared on the list of potential animal bioweapons as early as 1952 (82) . However, thereafter anthrax was assumably dropped from the antianimal biological weapons agent lists because an effective vaccine had been developed.
The animal pathogens and the species affected that are most often mentioned as being the most important as potential agroterrorism attack agents are, for cattle, foot-and-mouth disease virus and rinderpest virus; for swine, foot-and-mouth disease virus, classical swine fever virus, and African swine fever virus; and for poultry, avian influenza virus and Newcastle disease virus.
It should be noted that all of these viruses spread quite readily on their own and would not require any microbiological manipulation or weaponization to make them effective agents to engender an outbreak.
THE OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES EPIZOOTIES
The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) (http://www.oie.int/ info) serves as the world animal health organization and is headquartered in Paris, France. This important organization was founded in 1924 and presently has 151 member countries. The OIE is an independent organization and is funded by member countries. The main objectives of the OIE are to inform governments of the occurrence and course of animal diseases throughout the world and of ways to control these diseases; coordinate, at the international level, studies devoted to the surveillance and control of animal diseases; and harmonize regulations for trade in animals and animal products among member countries. Through international cooperation, the OIE develops procedures, guidelines, and information sharing to help prevent the spread and introduction of important infectious diseases of livestock and poultry. The OIE maintains two levels of animal disease lists. List A animal diseases characteristically are highly infectious, spread rapidly irrespective of international borders, often cause catastrophic economic losses, and have major socioeconomic impact on affected countries. These list A diseases are rigorously monitored on a global basis by the OIE, and international agreements require member countries to report outbreaks of these diseases to the OIE within 24 h of laboratory confirmation. Trading partners impose severe trade restrictions on members who have outbreaks of list A diseases. The 15 list A animal diseases consist of 14 viral diseases (foot-and-mouth disease, swine vesicular disease, classical swine fever, African swine fever, rinderpest, peste des petits ruminants, vesicular stomatitis, bluetongue, Rift Valley fever, lumpy skin disease, sheep and goat pox, African horse sickness, highly pathogenic avian influenza, and Newcastle disease) and one bacterial disease (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia). After the original diagnosis of a list A disease, the country must periodically report specific information on the epidemiology, control, and eradication progress to OIE. All this information, including the original diagnosis, is immediately electronically communicated to all OIE member countries. Upon receiving this information, member countries may enact trade embargoes against the infected country. This consequence is the major negative economic impact when a list A disease is naturally or intentionally introduced into a country. For example, when Taiwan diagnosed FMD on 17 March 1997 and communicated this to OIE, this diagnosis was immediately communicated to all OIE member countries. Upon receipt of this information, all Taiwan pork export products were immediately embargoed. Taiwan's once very lucrative billion-dollar pork export market literally disappeared overnight following the diagnosis of FMD. Over the years this will amount to approximately a $15 billion loss to the Taiwan pork industry and related industries.
List B diseases are grouped by animal species and are considered of socioeconomic or public health importance within countries. There are some misconceptions that list B diseases are less important than list A diseases and do not have as much of an effect on international trade. This, however, is not necessarily true. Take for example the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE; "mad cow disease") in Great Britain. This disease has caused significant and long-standing barriers to trade of meat and meat products from Great Britain to other countries, including the United States. Despite the enormous economic impact of this disease, it is still classified as list B and not a list A disease. This classification is based on the fact that although it is transmissible, it is not highly contagious. A few other examples of important OIE list B diseases that are closely monitored in domestic and international trade are brucellosis and tuberculosis in cattle, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome and trichinellosis of swine, and Marek's disease and infectious laryngotracheitis of poultry. Natural or intentional outbreaks of these diseases do have significant economic impact.
RESPONSE TO INCURSION OF A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES
The emergency program (EP) of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Service (VS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is well positioned to respond to an intentionally or naturally introduced foreign animal disease (19) . EP, as the "911" of the U.S. livestock industry, would coordinate the entire emergency response plan in close coordination with state veterinary officials, veterinary colleges, industry officials, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the American Veterinary Medical Association, private veterinary practitioners, and livestock and poultry producers. Critical to this response would be the approximately 350 federal, state, military, university, and private veterinarians specially trained as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, who are strategically located across the United States, available to respond within 24 h to a suspected foreign animal disease outbreak. Supporting this infrastructure is the Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO), of which EP maintains two, the eastern and western READEOs. The READEO is a 38-person team available for immediate call-up to control and eradicate a foreign animal disease. Smaller teams, three or four persons, called emergency response teams, may be called up in smaller outbreaks. The READEO trains regularly with field and tabletop computer exercises. The most recent full-scale field exercise was conducted on 6 November 1998, when the USDA simulated the intentional release of a virus similar to foot-and-mouth disease virus. A simulated terrorist group entered three livestock auctions or sale barns in California, Minnesota, and Florida simultaneously and released the viral agent. The eastern and western READEOs were fully mobilized to the field and exercised with local and regional veterinary and legal personnel, including the FBI, for 1 week. The Canadian veterinary emergency response team also participated because the simulated exercise included having the disease outbreak spread into Canada.
Integral to the READEO is the legal unit (67). This unit would have special forensic and investigative responsibilities in an outbreak that was intentionally introduced. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) staff and other local, regional, and national law enforcement personnel, including the FBI, will staff the legal unit in the READEO. They will spearhead the investigation and collection of forensic evidence and material should there be evidence of an intentional or criminal act. This OIG unit would coordinate with other law enforcement organizations throughout the United States, including local, regional, and national police staff and the FBI.
In an intentional or naturally introduced foreign animal disease, the READEOs will operate from field headquarters selected at the onset of the outbreak, very likely an established emergency or disaster response center in the state involved. The headquarters national emergency response team will operate from an emergency management operation center, the Emergency Response Center, which is an integral part of the APHIS emergency management system. This modern, fully equipped 8,000-ft 2 facility is located in the USDA APHIS headquarters building in Riverdale, Md.
CONTEMPORARY ANTILIVESTOCK AND ANTIPOULTRY AGROTERRORISM, BIOLOGICAL CRIMES, AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUES
An agroterrorism attack on the U.S. livestock industry would cause major economic losses for the livestock industry and related spinoff agroindustries. An intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease, especially a zoonotic agent, would cause panic and social instability and certainly result in a decrease in public confidence in the local, regional, and national safety of food. It is believed that the bovine spongiform encephalopathy epidemic and resultant public outcry were partly responsible for the fall of the U.K. Tory government under John Major during the mid-1990s.
The intentional introduction of a highly transmissible, economically costly livestock or poultry disease would be an inexpensive operation. One is reminded of the millions of dollars required to build, maintain, and operate a modern laboratory for human pathogens for use in bioterrorism; such an infrastructure is not needed in the case of animals. Antilivestock programs are not manpower or cash intensive. Animal agents are readily available from clinical specimens that can be collected throughout the world where the diseases are endemic and where many of the list A diseases occur on a frighteningly regular basis. For example, FMD viruses have been reported by the OIE to occur in 25 countries in the last 18 months, permitting ready access to field specimens. In a recent important New Zealand veterinary publication, it was stated that the terrorist or criminal introduction of FMD represented a most likely source of introduction over the next 20 years (38) .
VALUE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE
The economies of many countries around the world are inextricably linked to agriculture, and the United States is no exception. In the United States, agriculture is the largest single sector in our economy, making up approximately 13.3% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Over 24 million Americans are employed in some aspect of agriculture, making it the single largest employer. In 1999, agricultural cash receipts from crops and livestock and poultry were $190.7 billion; livestock and poultry accounted for almost half of this total ($95 billion).
The United States is the world's leading exporter of agricultural products, with growing annual income from exports of $53.7 billion in 1998. U.S. agricultural exports account for about 15% of all global agricultural exports. The share of U.S. agricultural production exported is more than double that of other major U.S. industries and therefore contributes as a positive factor toward the U.S. balance of trade. In 1998, the United States exported $10.9 billion of animals and animal products. The cost of food to the U.S. consumer is less than 11% of per capita disposable income, giving Americans the least expensive and the highest-quality food in the world.
Farm gate receipts represent but a small portion of the overall value of agriculture to the U.S. economy. There are a number of allied industries, such as supplies, transporters, distributors, food processors, exporters, fast food chains, and restaurants that are all part of the greater web of the U.S. food industry. Consequently, the downstream effect of undermining U.S. agriculture through intentional introduction of animal or plant disease pathogens with the malicious intent of undermining the U.S. economy would create a tidal wave effect felt by all of these sectors of our economy, including, ultimately, the American consumer. Any country that has agriculture as a central theme in its economy, as does the United States, is equally vulnerable to the negative effects of catastrophic animal disease outbreaks that would negatively impact agricultural production.
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN INTENTIONALLY INTRODUCED LIVESTOCK DISEASE
Many factors are of importance in determining the negative economic impact of an intentional introduction or natural incursion of a foreign animal disease. The total economic impact will be very much the same for a foreign animal disease, whether it is a natural incursion or an intentional introduction. Certainly the type of disease agent and the potential range of species susceptible to that agent would be critical. For example, FMD virus affects all cloven-hoofed animals, including approximately 60 species of wildlife and zoo animals. FMD would therefore, have a much greater economic impact than a virus that caused disease in only one species (60) . The ease of transmission on fomites and the possibility of airborne viral dissemination would also be important, as would the presence of subclinical or carrier animals. Our trading partners would very likely enact similar trade embargoes or restrictions on the U.S. livestock industry whether the disease was a natural incursion or an intentional introduction. A review of the financial losses associated with natural foreign animal disease outbreaks in other countries might provide an idea of the costs involved. In order to determine such economic losses, several factors must be considered, and in all cases such information is not factored in. Indeed, losses due to a foreign animal disease might not be fully known for 3 to 5 years after the end of the outbreak. The costs of a foreign animal disease are (i) costs of diagnosis and surveillance; (ii) direct costs of depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, and quarantine; (iii) direct, indirect, and induced losses in the economy of the country or state; and (iv) losses due to trade restrictions (62) . Rarely are all these factors considered when determining reported losses in a country. A study published in 1994 indicated that if African swine fever were established in the U.S. swine population, the cost over a 10-year period would be approximately $5.4 billion. Today, that figure would likely be three to five times higher. A recent FMD outbreak in Italy in 1993 cost $8.6 million to eradicate and $3.2 million for cleaning, disinfection, and carcass disposal. Indirect trade losses were estimated at $120 million (21) . A recent study from California presented eight different scenarios associated with a theoretical FMD outbreak. The suggested economic losses in each of these situations were staggering. Depending on the duration of the outbreak and geographical spread, losses ranged from $6 billion to $13 billion in just a few weeks (34) . Delay in the eradication or control of FMD might cost California $1 billion per day in trade sanctions (57) .
Included here are some economic figures representing the significant losses caused by foreign animal diseases. Diagnosis, control, surveillance, and eradication programs for BSE have cost the United Kingdom $7 billion (see chapter 7). The costs of this frightening outbreak to the United Kingdom trade and export markets have not yet been published but will certainly be in the billions of dollars. FMD was diagnosed in Taiwan in March 1997 and is still ravaging the economy of Taiwan over 3 years later. The costs for diagnosis, surveillance, depopulation, cleaning, disinfection, and related eradication programs have been set at approximately $4 billion (86) . Despite this tremendous expenditure of funds, FMD has not been eradicated from Taiwan. Indirect economic losses due to trade embargoes will not be realized for many years but will be near $15 billion. Australia has experienced several small, localized VVND outbreaks in the past 10 years. The 1999 VVND epidemic costs, including diagnosis, quarantine, cleaning and disinfection, and depopulation, have been estimated to be about $15 million. Trade and export losses will certainly push that figure much higher. The economic costs of the hog cholera outbreak in the Netherlands in 1997-1998 will approach $2.3 billion (61) . From February to April 1999, Malaysia experienced a devastating epidemic of a viral disease in both swine and humans. The virus has been termed Nipah virus.
To date, many hundreds of humans have been infected, and 109 have died. Over a million pigs were depopulated to control and eradicate the disease. The once economically viable swine industry in Malaysia has been totally destroyed, amounting to millions of U.S. dollars. The full negative impact of the epidemic has not yet been determined (M. Bunning, personal communication).
Many of the OIE list A diseases can infect free-ranging and zoo-contained wild animals. Should an intentionally introduced list A disease cross over to wildlife in the United States, the negative economic consequences could be catastrophic. People in the United States spend approximately $100 billion dollars annually on hunting, fishing, and nonconsumption wildlife activities. These activities would be seriously jeopardized by such an outbreak (V. Nettles, personal communication).
POTENTIAL DISSEMINATION OF AN INTENTIONALLY INTRODUCED ANTILIVESTOCK AGENT
Livestock movement around and across the United States is a very big business and would greatly facilitate the hitchhiking of a highly contagious viral disease such as FMD. A pound of meat travels about 1,000 miles on the hoof before it reaches the dinner table. The volume, length, and rapidity of movement vary from state to state and reflect many market factors. In the Southeast, 2,000 to 3,000 cattle and feeder calves move daily from many auction or sale barns to various locations in the East and Midwest, some moving as far as 1,500 miles in 3 days. These animals may be shipped to slaughter, feed lots, and farms and ranches. During this movement the animals come in contact with a variety of fomites that can readily harbor and transmit the virus. People, trucks, animal crates, clothing, and other fomites are a well-recognized source for transmitting the viruses responsible for FMD, hog cholera, and other infectious diseases.
In the western United States, economic forces within the various cattle industries increasingly contribute to wider and more rapid movement of livestock both within California and to other states. Dissemination within California is increasing, particularly in the dairy industry. One example is the move toward contract rearing of replacement heifers by large calf-raising operations, which may typically manage 10,000 to 40,000 calves from up to 80 or more dairies. Calves are transported daily from the dairies to the calf-raising site, and each week weaned calves are hauled back to dairies of other facilities that raise heifers (34) . The low operating margin for dairy and beef enterprises dictates that marginally productive cattle need to be culled quickly and that replacement stock be obtained quickly from whatever source can offer a competitive price that will be expected to maximize the marginal return. Consequently, cattle are moved rapidly into and out of the state according to the market for replacement cattle, stockers, feeders, etc. In a recent survey of some representative sales yards, it was estimated that 20 to 30% of cattle were consigned to a nonslaughter destination more than 30 to 40 km from the sales yard location (M. Thurmond, personal communication). Cattle can readily cross several states within 36 to 48 h after leaving the sales yard, depending on the route, the number of drivers, and the number of stops made.
These auction and sale barns are ideal locations to intentionally introduce a highly contagious virus because there is minimal security at such auctions and the sale barn contains ample numbers of disseminators, the animal themselves, that will soon be shipped to many different locations, carrying the virus with them. In the late 1950s and 1960s, U.S. officials staged several test exercises at several auction and sale barns in the United States to practice the intentional introduction of a virus such as FMD. The men, posing as cattle buyers, disseminated a water spray (mimicking FMD virus release) from small hand-held spray cans into cattle pens, alleyways, and loading docks (30, 31) . They were able to do this in several locations across the United States without interception. We believe that today a similar event could be duplicated without interception. Indeed, today, it might be easier, as some auction and sale barns have catwalks above the pens, making intentional introduction from above the animals much easier. Selecting a disease which has a slightly longer incubation period and a disease that may have silent carrier animals (that may show no signs of the disease but will be shedding the virus) would greatly facilitate the rapid spread of the virus. FMD virus is an example of such a virus.
ON-FARM BIOSECURITY
On-farm and livestock auction and stockyard security is an important aspect in preventing the intentional or natural introduction of an exotic or foreign animal disease. The top 30 cattle feeders in the United States have the capacity to maintain from 50,000 to 500,000 head of cattle at any one time in their feedlots. Meat packers process approximately 30,000 head of cattle a year, with four companies processing approximately 80% of the carcasses sent to slaughter. Over 5 million head of these cattle pass through public markets and auctions. Thus, on average, almost 100,000 head of cattle are slaughtered per day in the United States. We will not include a comprehensive review of the literature on this subject matter for cattle (dairy or beef), swine, sheep, and poultry but will glean a few relevant issues for presentation.
The six largest pork producers in the United States maintain from 100,000 to 700,000 sows per year. Biosecurity on swine farms includes such activities as (i) animal quarantine procedures, (ii) blood testing of new arrivals, (iii) control of human movement onto the farm, (iv) control of vermin, (v) farm locations, and (vi) movement of vehicles onto the farm. A survey of pork producers has indicated discouraging and dangerous trends in overall basic elements of on-farm biosecurity activities (5). For example, half the swine farms receiving new breeding stock did not isolate or quarantine new animal purchases. The 1995 survey showed that 60% did not control or limit the entrance of visitors, technical representatives, or feed delivery trucks and personnel (5, 34) . In California and other states, it is common to cull diseased animals for slaughter, and many culled sows from California are shipped to the Midwest for slaughter, providing easy movement of a highly contagious virus (3, 13) .
In California, the large operations closely observe and practice basic on-farm biosecurity measures, but medium and small producers pay limited attention to biosecurity. Renderers pick up most dead swine on the farm, providing an easy avenue for disease movement. In some instances, lots of finishing hogs may be diverted from slaughter and sent to another finishing operation, allowing easy spread of a foreign animal disease.
Some large U.S. dairies now have over 10,000 milking cows. Biosecurity on dairy and beef farms in the United States is less well documented (11, 12) . Approximately 70% of producers do not isolate or quarantine calves and young heifers upon arrival. The percentage of farms that do not isolate dry calves, lactating cows, weaned heifers, and bulls is much higher. On nearly 33% of dairy farms, young calves have contact with different age groups, allowing easy disease spread. Biosecurity practices on dairy and beef operations require significant improvement (6, (8) (9) (10) .
In California, the dairy industry requires large quantities of services, support, and inputs because of its vast economic size. Milk may be collected up to three times per day on a large farm. Milk trucks may visit as many dairies as necessary to completely fill their tanks, providing easy movement of a highly contagious viral animal disease. Animal buyers in California and other states may visit up to 25 dairies per day. Movements of people and vehicles, sharing of equipment, and other high-risk biosecurity breaches indicate that biosecurity on the farm in the United States is low.
PORT SECURITY PROCEDURES RELATED TO FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE EXCLUSION
APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) staff maintain inspection sites and activities in the United States at 82 international airports, 71 maritime seaports, and 25 land border crossings. In a cooperative effort, PPQ has the important responsibility of ensuring compliance with agricultural product rules and regulations, while the customs authority is charged with the responsibility of enforcing all rules and regulations relevant to the entrance into the United States of agricultural products.
The international movement and transport of people, cargo ships, airplanes, and cars with their corresponding cargo and baggage is a major economic industry and is rapidly growing. Statistics from the customs fiscal year 1999 indicate that 584,004 commercial and 141,120 private international aircraft entered the United States. Transportation traffic into the United States during customs fiscal year 1999 included 200,000 ships, 125,000,000 privately operated vehicles, 463,000 buses, and 39,000 trains. PPQ and customs officials inspected approximately 400,000,000 international travelers who entered the United States via air, car, boat, truck, train, and bus and as pedestrians. In 1998 almost 15 million poultry, hatching eggs, embryos, semen samples, and livestock animals were imported into the United States. In addition, international mail volume into the United States in 1997 was 2.2 million air parcels and letters and 1.9 million sea parcels and letters. PPQ and customs officials in 1998 did intercept numerous illegal meat, poultry, and animal byproduct contraband. These products were intercepted at seaports, airports, and land border ports and through inspection of international mail. Approximately 300,000 intercepts were made for meat, poultry, and animal byproducts.
Despite the most stringent rules and regulations and the most vigilant PPQ and customs staff, including sophisticated X-ray detector equipment and 58 detector dog teams at 21 locations, the sheer volume of people and material at times overwhelms the system. At these particular times, the system is very susceptible to the intentional or criminal introduction of a serious animal disease pathogens.
DETERRENCE UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION
In The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975 and has been ratified by 141 countries and signed by an additional 18. However, this arms control agreement lacks what many believe must be a fundamental component of any such accord-a means to detect noncompliance. Negotiators did not include verification measures in the BWC because at that time it was believed that biological weapons lacked military utility. The revelation that one of the depository nations for the BWC, the Soviet Union, maintained an active BW program in violation of the convention until at least 1992; the finding by UNSCOM that Iraq produced and stockpiled biological munitions prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War (18); intelligence information indicating that several other countries are actively pursuing a BW capability (20) ; and advances in biotechnology over the last 25 years have significantly altered that view.
Deterring inappropriate dual use of the biological research and development infrastructure and biotechnological production facilities through legally binding and enforceable compliance to the BWC is critical. The BWC is nearly 28 years old, yet the BWC, which seeks to reduce the threat of biological warfare, lacks a legally binding protocol to monitor compliance. This weakness has limited the BWC's ability to deter biological weapons programs, even though it prohibits virtually all activities that could be part of a biological weapons program. It did not prevent Iraq from developing biological weapons (18) , nor did it deter continuance of the Soviet Union biological weapons programs that employed over tens of thousands of people and produced tens of tons of biological weapons.
Since 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of State Parties to the BWC has met periodically to negotiate a compliance regimen that will strengthen the treaty. To date, the Ad Hoc Group has achieved only modest progress. It is considering a variety of measures to strengthen the BWC, including annual declarations of activities of concern, investigations, and other on-site activities (50, 89) . Key to any protocol is the provision for filing annual declarations of activities or capabilities that might be relevant to the BWC. Activities currently being considered include biological defense, presence of listed agents, work with listed agents, production capacity, vaccine production, biopesticide research and production, biological containment, and aerobiology. These are referred to as declaration triggers. All of these activities are inherent in conduct of research and development by the United States government, industry, and academic institutions.
Ad Hoc Group negotiators are considering whether to require declarations from institutions possessing select plant, animal, and human pathogens and toxins or whether to focus the compliance regimen on specific activities with pathogens-such as large-scale production, work with listed agents and toxins, and aerobiology-that could be relevant to the development of biological weapons. For example, the term "work with listed agents and toxins" means any manipulation with a listed agent or toxin and covers research and development, production and recovery, and diagnosis. This includes studying the properties of those agents and toxins, detection and identification methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis, treatment methods, and maintenance of culture collections. The inclusion of microorganisms and toxins capable of affecting plants and animals in the lists of agents and toxins (Table 2 ) means that U.S. agencies and facilities working with those materials could be subject to declaration under a legally binding compliance protocol.
Although animal and plant pathogens have figured prominently in the history of biological warfare, highlighted by Germany's ambitious biological warfare program during World War I aimed at its enemies' livestock, they have received scant attention compared to pathogens capable of causing human disease (26) . Among the first to rediscover the importance of animal and plant pathogens as potential biological warfare agents was the Australia Group. Formed in 1984, the Australia Group is an informal and voluntary consortium of nations whose goal is the limitation of chemical and biological weapon proliferation. Members meet annually to review national export controls to try to limit the transfer of materials and equipment that could be used to create chemical and biological weapons. The group has created lists of items whose export should be controlled, as well as warning lists of items whose purchase could be indicative of proliferation activities. Their list of animal and plant pathogens of concern is very similar to Table 2 . With U.S. government funding and attention focused on countering biological weapons targeted at humans, agencies and groups are just now becoming aware of the threat posed by agroterrorism and biological warfare directed against our nation's animals and crops (42) . The threat of agroterrorism was given credence in recent years when information revealed the size and extent of the Soviet Union's antilivestock and anticrop biological weapons program. At the moment, the United States is considered highly vulnerable to such a threat. The U.S. government has launched a national effort to counter the threat posed by bioterrorism, and the agricultural sector is now included as a key component of that effort. The importance attached to the role of agriculture in the global economy is underscored by the emphasis given to animal and plant pathogens by the Ad Hoc Group of State Parties to the BWC. Agroterrorism should be viewed as an act of economic warfare. In this age of global agribusiness, any country that has its livestock or crops infected by endemic or exotic pathogens, either naturally or intentionally, is rapidly barred from export markets. Developing countries in particular recognize the dire consequences that an agroterrorism attack would have on the political, social, and economic sectors of their society and potentially on national survival itself. We need to view the threat posed by biological warfare and the use of biological weapons by terrorists as multidimensional and invest our resources accordingly.
LEGAL PROHIBITION OF AGROTERRORISM
Agroterrorism presents serious challenges to a legal system's ability to protect agroindustries from serious threats. America has laws to prosecute and punish agroterrorists. Unfortunately, however, agroterrorism demonstrates the limited ability of legal prohibitions to reduce prevailing risks.
Punishment for Committing an Act of Agroterrorism
Punishing agroterrorists, once they are apprehended and enough evidence is obtained for a conviction, is straightforward. Under 18 U.S.C.
§43, anyone who intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise by causing the loss of animals or property (in excess of $10,000) will be fined or imprisoned for up to 1 year. For agroterrorists who cause serious bodily injury to another person, the maximum jail sentence extends up to 10 years; if death is caused, the perpetrator can be imprisoned for any term of years. Moreover, the guilty agroterrorist will have to pay restitution for the loss of production or farm income reasonably attributable to the offense. The law provides stiffer penalties for terrorists who use weapons of mass destruction, including a biological agent, toxin, vector, or disease organism. Under 18 U.S.C. §2332, the punishment is severe, up to life imprisonment; if death results, the perpetrator may be executed. The term biological agent includes a biological product that may be engineered or naturally occurring. However, the application of §2332 to agroterrorism is problematic because, under that section, the use of weapons of mass destruction has to be against a person or against the property of the United States. An attack, even using biological agents, against only agricultural land or livestock would not qualify as weapons-of-mass-destruction terrorism. Proposals are currently under consideration in Congress that would either raise the penalties under 18 U.S.C. §43 or amend the definition of weapons-of-mass-destruction terrorism to include attacks against private property. Moreover, these proposals would also establish a National Animal Terrorism and Ecoterrorism Incident Clearinghouse for information on incidents for purposes of cross-referencing and assisting investigations.
Possessing Animal Pathogens
The problem with U.S. laws pertaining to agroterrorism is that they operate after the fact. Only a terrorist who has actually committed an act of agroterrorism and who has been caught can be prosecuted. Meanwhile, of course, the damage would be done, and prosecuting the perpetrator may mean little to the sector that has been devastated. Moreover, in view of the delayed nature of agroterrorism, a perpetrator may have considerable opportunity to commit the crime and then flee beyond detection and apprehension.
For this reason, many commentators have urged that criminal penalties should be imposed for various activities before an attack. Most often discussed is a prohibition against the possession of a pathogen (human or animal), even if that possessor has not yet used the material to commit a terrorist act. Under the Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act (21 U.S.C. §151 et seq.), it is illegal to prepare and sell or to import any worthless or harmful virus, serum, or toxin for domestic animals. However, possession by itself is not prohibited by this provision.
More generally, 18 U.S.C. §175 prohibits knowing development or possession of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon. A terrorist who develops or possesses any biological agent for use as a weapon can be fined or imprisoned. Another section, 18 U.S.C. §177, establishes an affirmative defense when the development or possession is for a prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose. The problem from a law enforcement perspective is for a prosecutor to produce evidence which proves that an accused's possession of deadly agents is "for use as a weapon" and not for a legally acceptable purpose. The Justice Department (like virtually every commentator) has recommended that unlicensed possession of pathogens be criminalized without regard to purpose or intent or to whether those pathogens have in fact been used to deadly effect. According to this proposal, only licensed facilities could legally develop or possess pathogens. The licensing process would be the proper venue to determine the applicant's purpose and intent, and necessarily, any possessor of pathogens who does not successfully obtain a license would be subject to prosecution.
Detecting Terrorist Conspiracies
Even laws that prohibit possession of pathogens may be inadequate (or too late) to prevent an agroterrorist from inflicting a catastrophe. Therefore, law enforcement officials such as the FBI and state and local police should be authorized to conduct investigations of suspicious activity. It is in this context, however, that federal law is most troubling.
The current laws that authorize investigations of potential terrorism rest on assumptions that may be misaligned for preventing and punishing agroterrorism. These assumptions are that an act of terrorism is likely to be carried out by an identifiable group whose distinct political agenda is overtly hostile to the American system or that is linked to a foreign group which opposes U.S. policy. Our laws reflect the belief that tracking groups who may be suspected of harboring such viewpoints is the best way to prevent an attack. Accordingly, law enforcement officials are authorized to monitor those groups and the people who support them, and strict punishments apply to apprehended perpetrators. Yet many experts believe that an act of bioterrorism, or more specifically of agroterrorism, is not likely to be undertaken by an organized political organization, and therefore monitoring their activities is not likely to be a productive focus. This criticism is enhanced by the fact that agroterrorism has few telltale markings or characteristics that law enforcement officials in the field can trace to detect preparations for an attack. Thus, the problem, in legal terms, is not that there are no laws to address the problem, but that the mechanisms adopted by those laws may be less than optimally effective.
By focusing on groups that are known to be ideologically antagonistic to the United States government, law enforcement officials can trace money and, in some cases, group leaders who are affiliated with international terrorist networks. If one of these known groups is planning an agroterrorist attack, it is possible that it will be detected. However, if the attack is planned by some person or group who is not known, detection is extremely unlikely. There is another problem with this approach: civil liberties advocates object to focusing on groups who have a hostile ideology lest that become a way to stifle unwelcome speech and political association. Many commentators assert that law enforcement should focus on the means of conducting terrorism and not on the ideology of the potential terrorist. This makes a great deal of sense in connection with nuclear terrorism as well as some forms of chemical and biological terrorism where the technology, equipment, and materials that would be necessary for an attack are sufficiently specialized to be distinguished from commonly obtainable items. Yet it is unlikely that the same holds true for agroterrorism, which can be undertaken using only naturally occurring disease agents.
The conclusion must be that our laws can punish an agroterrorist who has been caught after committing a crime. This prospect of punishment may act as a deterrent. However, for potential terrorists who either believe they can escape detection or are willing to accept punishment (perhaps even seek punishment to become martyrs), the deterrent value of punishment is insignificant. For our country to be truly secure, our laws should enable the FBI and others to detect terrorism before it happens without overstepping constitutional protections. Currently, this is less a reality than an aspiration.
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. livestock and agriculture-related industries are highly vulnerable to the introduction of an exotic or foreign animal disease which would have significant economic and public health consequences. The biological agents, both viral and bacterial, are readily available throughout the world, and dissemination is easily accomplished. Acquisition and dissemination of the animal biological agents are unsophisticated activities, requiring only minimal scientific or laboratory skills and education, and therefore the ability exists for intentional introduction. Many countries and states and nonstate groups possess the ability to obtain these agents and to disseminate them. The key problem is to measure the inten-tion of countries, states, and nonstates to conduct acts of intentional introduction. A sound intelligence system that is cognizant of the needs of agriculture is essential.
To date, there have been no known biological attacks on U.S. livestock or poultry industries (32, 36, 83) . We must remain alert to the possibility, however, because the United States and agroindustries of other countries have been the subject of criminal chemical attacks which have caused significant economic damage. In Wisconsin in 1996, chlordane was introduced into animal feed byproducts. The motive was to destroy a business competitor. This criminal event was successful, and as a result approximately 4,000 farmers in four Midwestern states, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota, received contaminated feed. A repeat criminal chemical introduction took place at the rendering company. On 14 September 1999, Brian W. (Skip) Lea was indicted on two counts of agricultural product tampering. He faces a possible 3-year prison term and a fine of $250,000 for each count (83) . Between 1977 and 1979 but most likely in February 1978, a terrorist group contaminated Israeli citrus produce (oranges, lemons, and grapefruit) with mercury. Contaminated produce was discovered in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The citrus export market of Israel immediately dropped by approximately 40%, causing a significant economic impact on that country's economy. These biocrimal acts and the consequent economic impact clearly demonstrate that agriculture can be the target of an economically devastating terrorist or criminal attack (23, 65, 72) .
